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Abstract
Background: Excessive alcohol use increases risks of chronic diseases such as coronary heart
disease and several types of cancer, with associated losses of quality of life and life-years. Alcohol
taxes can be considered as a public health instrument as they are known to be able to decrease
alcohol consumption. In this paper, we estimate the cost-effectiveness of an alcohol tax increase
for the entire Dutch population from a health-care perspective focusing on health benefits and
health-care costs in alcohol users.
Methods:  The chronic disease model of the National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment was used to extrapolate from decreased alcohol consumption due to tax increases
to effects on health-care costs, life-years gained and quality-adjusted life-years gained, A Dutch
scenario in which tax increases for beer are planned, and a Swedish scenario representing one of
the highest alcohol taxes in Europe, were compared with current practice in the Netherlands. To
estimate cost-effectiveness ratios, yearly differences in model outcomes between intervention and
current practice scenarios were discounted and added over the time horizon of 100 years to find
net present values for incremental life-years gained, quality-adjusted life-years gained, and health-
care costs.
Results: In the Swedish scenario, many more quality-adjusted life-years were gained than in the
Dutch scenario, but both scenarios had almost equal incremental cost-effectiveness ratios: €5100
per quality-adjusted life-year and €5300 per quality-adjusted life-year, respectively.
Conclusion: Focusing on health-care costs and health consequences for drinkers, an alcohol tax
increase is a cost-effective policy instrument.
Background
Excessive alcohol use is a cause of morbidity and mortality
as it increases risks of chronic diseases such as coronary
heart disease and several types of cancer, with associated
losses of quality of life and life-years [1,2]. Moreover,
excessive alcohol consumption is associated with (inten-
tional and unintentional) injuries [2,3]. In Europe, the
average alcohol consumption is about 11–13 litres of pure
Published: 28 November 2008
BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 doi:10.1186/1741-7015-6-36
Received: 10 November 2008
Accepted: 28 November 2008
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
© 2008 Berg et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
Page 2 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
alcohol per adult per year [3,4]. Currently about 14% of
Dutch men aged 12 and over drink more than three alco-
holic consumptions per day and about 10% of Dutch
women aged 12 and over drink more than two alcoholic
consumptions per day [5]. As a consequence of these
drinking patterns, almost 7% of the burden of disease in
Western Europe is alcohol related [1,2]. In the Nether-
lands, about 1% of the mortality, 4.5% of the burden of
disease and 0.6% of the total health-care costs in 2003 can
be attributed to chronic diseases caused by alcohol con-
sumption [5].
Alcohol control in its various guises potentially decreases
the burden of disease substantially and thus is an impor-
tant instrument for health-care policy. Alcohol policies
include measures to reduce the availability of alcohol,
alcohol taxation, restricting the sale of alcohol, regulating
the drinking context, restrictions on alcohol marketing,
drink-driving counter-measures, education and persua-
sion, and early intervention and treatment services [6].
Alcohol tax increase is a public policy tool that tradition-
ally falls outside the scope of health policy. The reason for
this might be that alcohol taxes usually are controlled by
ministries of finance and that tax revenues are not part of
the health-care budget. A notable exception in this respect
is Thailand where excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco are
used to fund major health-care programmes [7]. Still,
from a public health perspective alcohol taxes are an
important instrument, as they are known to be able to
decrease alcohol consumption [6,8]. Tax increases have
been shown to decrease, for instance, cirrhosis mortality
and drink-driving deaths [2].
Since in most Western countries retail prices of alcohol are
heavily influenced by alcohol excise taxes [3], an increase
in alcohol taxes normally leads to an increase in prices of
alcohol, which in turn leads to a decrease in the demand
for alcohol. To measure the effect of price increases on
alcohol consumption, economists estimate the price elas-
ticity that indicates how much the consumption of a cer-
tain good changes if its price is changed. Clements et al [9]
report price elasticity figures for seven countries (Finland,
Sweden, Norway, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zea-
land), covering the period from the mid-1950s to the
mid-1980s [9]. They find a price elasticity of -0.35 for
beer, -0.68 for wine and -0.98 for spirits. These price elas-
ticity figures imply that if, for instance, beer prices increase
by 10%, beer consumption decreases by 3.5%.
So, increasing alcohol taxes may be an effective strategy to
control alcohol consumption, but is it also cost-effective?
The information needed to answer this question can be
provided by an economic evaluation. An economic evalu-
ation is a comparative analysis of the costs and effects of
two or more interventions [10]. The outcome of an eco-
nomic evaluation is expressed as a ratio of incremental
costs to incremental effects: the incremental cost-effective-
ness ratio (ICER). To our knowledge, the only previous
study on the cost-effectiveness of alcohol taxation was
conducted within the World Health Organization
(WHO)-CHOICE project [11,12]. They found that alco-
hol control policies, particularly tax increases on alcohol,
are cost-effective relative to other health interventions.
However, in their estimates of the cost-effectiveness of
alcohol taxes, they only took into account health effects
derived from heavy drinkers and ignored the effects of tax-
ation on the health of moderate drinkers.
In this paper, we estimate the cost-effectiveness of an
increase in alcohol tax using a dynamic model for the
entire Dutch population from a health-care perspective,
focusing on health benefits and health-care costs in alco-
hol users themselves. This implies that we will not take
into account the external effects of alcohol prevention
policies (for example, through a reduction of harm done
to others through violence). Also, since knowledge is only
available on the effects of price increases on average con-
sumption of alcohol, we were unable to take into account
the effects on specific subgroups with deviant drinking
patterns (for example, binge drinking on 1 or 2 days a
week and abstinence on the remaining days) and on alco-
hol dependency.
Methods
The National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment chronic disease model
To extrapolate from decreased alcohol consumption due
to tax increases to effects on health-care costs, life-years
gained and quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained,
the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment chronic disease model (CDM) was used [13-
17]. The CDM is a tool to describe the morbidity and mor-
tality effects of risk factors for chronic diseases, such as
smoking and overweight, and has been used for projec-
tions of risk factor and disease prevalence, estimates of
health-adjusted life expectancy and cost-effectiveness
analysis. This population model describes the life course
of cohorts in terms of changes between risk factor classes
and changes between disease states over time. It allows for
co-morbidity and includes data on the most important
chronic diseases and their risk factors. Risk factors and dis-
eases are linked through relative risks on disease inci-
dence. The model relates the risk factor alcohol use to the
following diseases: coronary heart disease, stroke,
oesophageal cancer, breast cancer, oral cavity cancer and
laryngeal cancer. Alcohol classes distinguished in the
CDM are for women: abstinence (no alcohol consump-
tion), moderate alcohol consumption (fewer than two
standard drink units per day), excessive alcohol consump-
tion (between two and four standard drink units per day)BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
Page 3 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
and dangerous alcohol consumption (more than four
standard drink units per day), and for men: abstinence
(no alcohol consumption), moderate alcohol consump-
tion (fewer than four standard drink units per day), exces-
sive alcohol consumption (between four and six standard
drink units per day) and dangerous alcohol consumption
(more than six standard drink units per day) [18].
Table 1 displays the relative risks for diseases related to
alcohol consumption and all-cause mortality employed
in the CDM, which are all derived from a meta-analysis
[18]. From Table 1, it can be seen that alcohol consump-
tion has a positive influence on coronary heart disease
and stroke (with the exception of dangerous drinking),
but a negative influence on the incidence of several types
of cancers. Dangerous levels of alcohol consumption are
also negatively related to stroke incidence. To capture the
influence of increased mortality caused by alcohol
through causes of death not explicitly modelled in the
CDM, a relative risk of other causes of death is employed
in the CDM [14]. In this way, the influence of alcohol on
mortality caused by injuries (for example, traffic acci-
dents) and non-CDM diseases (for example, liver cirrho-
sis) is taken into account.
Table 1 shows the challenge and difficulties of alcohol
prevention policies, as moderate and even excessive con-
sumption of alcohol not only has negative public health
effects, but positive effects as well. It should be noted that
oesophageal, laryngeal and oral cavity cancers have a low
incidence compared with cardiovascular disease, stroke
and breast cancer. On balance, excessive and dangerous
levels of alcohol consumption have been shown to have
an elevated mortality risk [11,19].
Scenarios
To evaluate the long-term effects of alcohol tax increases,
the following two intervention scenarios were compared
with the current practice scenario (excise taxes as imple-
mented in 2007 in the Netherlands).
0 Current practice: in the Netherlands the taxes on alcohol
are 8 cents per bottle of beer (0.3 litre), 44 cents per bottle
of wine (0.75 litre), and 371 cents per bottle of spirit (0.7
litre) [20].
1 'Dutch scenario': health effects and cost-effectiveness of
the tax increase as currently planned for 2009 are esti-
mated. The government has planned a tax increase on
beer of 2.7 cents per bottle of beer (0.3 litre) [21]. As cur-
rently planned, excise taxes for spirits will remain
unchanged compared with the current practice scenario. It
is assumed that producers fully pass on the tax increase to
consumers.
2 'Swedish scenario': health effects and cost-effectiveness
of a tax increase are estimated, assuming that tax levels are
increased to the same level as in Sweden, which has one
of the highest alcohol taxes in the EU. This would imply
that taxes on beer would be increased by €0.18 per bottle
of beer, wine by €1.34 per 75 cl and spirits by €9.51 per
70 cl [20]. In this scenario it is also assumed that produc-
ers fully pass on the tax increase to consumers.
Table 1: Relative risks1 of four different categories of alcohol consumption on disease incidence and all-cause mortality, both for men 
(upper row) and women (lower row)
Abstinence Moderate2 Excessive2 Dangerous2
Coronary heart disease 1 0.82 0.84 0.88
1 0.82 0.84 0.88
Stroke 1 0.60 0.92 1.79
1 0.58 0.48 7.96
Oesophageal cancer 1 1.80 2.37 4.26
1 1.80 2.37 4.26
Breast cancer 1 1 1 1
1 1.09 1.31 1.68
Laryngeal cancer 1 1.83 3.90 4.93
1 1.83 3.90 4.93
Oral cavity cancer 1 1.45 1.85 5.39
1 1.45 1.85 5.39
All-cause mortality 1 0.91 1.15 1.35
1 0.96 1.35 1.49
1For 95% confidence intervals for all relative risks, see Holman et al [18].
2Definitions of alcohol consumption categories:
moderate: fewer than two standard drinks (< 20 g) per day for women, and fewer than four standard drinks (< 40 g) per day for men;
excessive: 2–4 standard drinks (20–40 g) per day for women, and 4–6 standard drinks (40–60 g) per day for men;
dangerous: more than four standard drinks (> 40 g) per day for women, and more than six standard drinks (> 60 g) per day for men.BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
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In the current practice scenario, we made projections with
the CDM of QALYs and health-care costs using the distri-
bution of alcohol consumption. This distribution was
estimated using data from the annual General Public
Health and Lifestyle Survey (Dutch initials: POLS) from
Statistics Netherlands. These were then compared with the
intervention scenarios. We estimated alcohol consump-
tion distribution, which had been changed due to the
alcohol tax increases, using the price elasticity estimates
published by Clements et al [9]. This was carried out by
first subtracting the average decrease in alcohol consump-
tion due to the tax increase for every individual on the raw
POLS data. Then, the alcohol consumption distribution
was re-estimated. To calculate the average relative decrease
in alcohol consumption due to absolute tax increases for
the different types of alcohol, the absolute price increase
had to be transformed in a relative price increase. To do
this, data on the market shares and prices of beer, wine
and spirits were needed. Market shares of the different
types of alcohol were taken from Cnossen [3] and a range
of sales prices was taken using supermarket prices as a
minimum and catering industry prices as a maximum.
Although there are some (administrative) costs related to
alcohol tax increases, from a strict health-care perspective,
intervention costs are absent.
To find cost-effectiveness ratios, yearly differences in
model outcomes between intervention and current prac-
tice scenarios were discounted and added over the time
horizon to find net present values for incremental life-
years gained, QALYs gained and health-care costs. Future
costs and effects were discounted at the Dutch standard
annual percentages of 4% for costs and 1.5% for effects.
The time horizon was 100 years since by then the cohorts
that experienced the price increase have become extinct.
Data for cost of illness in the Netherlands for 2003 were
used to estimate health-care expenditure in the different
scenarios [22]. Average (age- and sex-specific) annual
costs per patient having a certain disease were calculated
by dividing the total annual costs by Dutch prevalence
numbers for each disease in 2003. First, the annual dis-
ease costs per patient were multiplied by the projections
of future prevalence numbers for each chronic disease in
the model. Then, to calculate health-care costs for all
'other' diseases, the numbers of survivors were multiplied
by age- and sex-specific cost profiles of 'remaining' costs.
These latter are the difference between total health-care
costs and the costs of the diseases incorporated explicitly
in the model. Finally, these two categories of costs, one
related and the other unrelated to the risk factor under
study, were added to estimate annual costs. To calculate
lifetime health-care costs, annual costs were added over
time (see the Additional file 1 for costs per patient per
year). All cost data were presented in euros at the 2003
price level.
With probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA), uncertainty
in the input parameters is addressed and reflected in the
model output (the ICER). In the PSA we explored the
uncertainty around our base-case ICER estimate, associ-
ated with the uncertainty around the relative risk values
[18], values of the price elasticity [9] and mean selling
prices of the different types of alcohol needed to calculate
the relative price increase. Table 2 summarises the
assumptions in the different scenarios.
Results
In the Dutch scenario, alcohol consumption decreases on
average by 0.3% and in the Swedish scenario, alcohol con-
sumption decreases on average by 18.3%. The effects of
these decreases in alcohol consumption on health are dis-
played in Figures 1 and 2 for mean values of the input
parameters as displayed in Table 2. The decrease in alco-
hol consumption results in a decrease in the incidence of
alcohol-related diseases, which causes a gain in life-years
and QALYs compared with current practice. The largest
effects occur some 30 years after the tax increase when the
population that experienced the price increase becomes
middle aged. The health gains approach zero as these
cohorts become extinct. Figure 1 illustrates the large dif-
ference in health gain between the Dutch and Swedish
scenarios.
To understand the effects of alcohol tax increases on
health-care costs, Figure 3 displays differences in health-
care costs between the Dutch and the current practice sce-
narios for mean values of the input parameters as dis-
played in Table 2. The decrease in the incidence of
diseases causally related to alcohol results in a decrease in
health-care costs of those diseases. However, the gain in
life-years causes an increase in the prevalence of all dis-
eases unrelated to alcohol. From Figure 3, it can be seen
that the savings in health-care costs of alcohol-related dis-
eases are outweighed by increases in the health-care costs
of diseases not related to alcohol in life-years gained.
Figures 4 and 5 display cumulative differences in costs and
effects (both discounted) of the two alcohol tax scenarios
compared with no tax increase over a period of 100 years
for all values of the input parameters. This figure illus-
trates the strong correlation between health gains and
health-care costs. This is due to the fact that the additional
health-care costs are solely the result of increases in life
expectancy from a reduction in alcohol consumption.
Thus, the more QALYs gained the more additional health-
care costs. The health gains in the Swedish scenario are
much larger than in the Dutch scenario because the price
increases are much higher in the Swedish scenario.BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
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Table 3 shows cumulative differences in health gains, cost
differences and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios.
Although the Swedish scenario results in many more costs
and QALYs than the Dutch scenario, the costs per QALY
are approximately equal. Costs per QALY are higher than
costs per life-year gained in both scenarios.
Figure 6 displays the cost-effectiveness acceptability curves
(CEAC) for the alcohol tax increases. A CEAC shows the
probability that an intervention is cost-effective for differ-
ent values of the threshold, that is, for different monetary
values placed on a QALY. What can be derived from Figure
4 is that, if QALYs are, for instance, valued at €5000, a tax
increase is cost-effective with a probability of 0.5. How-
ever, if society is willing to pay €10,000 per QALY (which
is below the threshold value of €20,000 per QALY that is
frequently cited in the Netherlands [23,24], and far below
most other estimates of the value society is willing to pay
for a QALY [25]), a tax increase is cost-effective with a
probability of almost one.
Discussion
Previous research investigating the cost-effectiveness of a
reduction of alcohol consumption only took into account
the health effects in heavy drinkers [11,12]. However,
since alcohol taxes cannot be targeted at this specific
group of drinkers (the definition of heavy drinking in that
study equals our categories of excessive and dangerous
alcohol consumption together), health effects in the
entire population, including moderate drinkers, need to
be considered. Moderate drinkers even experience some
disutility from a tax increase, making this policy a no
Pareto improvement, but rather a Kaldor-Hicks improve-
ment, whereby those people worse off theoretically can be
compensated for by those persons that are better off with
a certain policy option. Another difference with respect to
the WHO-CHOICE study is how health effects were mod-
elled. In the WHO approach, alcohol itself was modelled
with a direct effect on mortality and quality of life. In our
study, we modelled effects on quality of life and mortality
through the effects of alcohol on alcohol-related diseases
and all-cause mortality. We focused on the dynamic
effects of alcohol tax increases on health effects in drinkers
themselves and their associated health-care costs.
Although in theory an alcohol tax increase can be imple-
mented by legislation alone, some administrative costs
and possible costs of law enforcement to keep smuggling
to a minimum have to be made to successfully implement
a tax increase. These costs, as well as additional tax reve-
nues, are usually carried by sectors outside the health-care
sector. Therefore, for an alcohol tax increase, taking the
Table 2: Summary of assumptions and input data
Dutch scenario Swedish scenario
Discount rate 4% costs and 1.5% effects 4% costs and 1.5% effects
Time horizon 100 years 100 years
Target population Current Dutch population Current Dutch population
Price increase Beer: 2.7 cents Beer: 18 cents
Wine: no increase Wine: 134 cents
Spirits: no increase Spirits: 951 cents
Price elasticity beer1 Normal distribution Normal distribution
Mean: -0.35 Mean: -0.35
Standard deviation: 0.17 Standard deviation: 0.17
Price elasticity wine1 Normal distribution Normal distribution
Mean: -0.68 Mean: -0.68
Standard deviation: 0.54 Standard deviation: 0.54
Price elasticity spirits1 Normal distribution Normal distribution
Mean: -0.98 Mean: -0.98
Standard deviation: 0.73 Standard deviation: 0.73
Market share different types of alcohol2 Beer: 44% Beer: 44%
Wine: 33% Wine: 33%
Spirits: 23% Spirits: 23%
Mean current price of beer in €3 Uniform distribution 0.50–2.50 Uniform distribution 0.50–2.50
Mean current price of wine in €3 Uniform distribution 5.00–15.00 Uniform distribution 5.00–15.00
Mean current price of spirits in €3 Uniform distribution 10.00–25.00 Uniform distribution 10.00–25.00
Costs of intervention None None
Health-care costs Depend on age and disease status Depend on age and disease status
Quality-adjusted life-years Depends on age and disease status Depends on age and disease status
1Mean and standard deviation estimated using individual country estimates presented in Clements et al [9].
2Derived from Cnossen [3].
3Minimum based on supermarket prices, maximum based on catering industry.BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
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Quality-adjusted life-years gained due to alcohol tax increases Figure 1
Quality-adjusted life-years gained due to alcohol tax increases. Quality-adjusted life-years (undiscounted) gained over 
time due to alcohol tax increases in both scenarios for mean values of the input parameters as displayed in table 2.
20 40 60 80 100
Years
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15
20
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QALYs gained
  1, 000
Swedish
scenario
Dutch
scenario
Health gains in the Dutch scenario Figure 2
Health gains in the Dutch scenario. Life-years and quality-adjusted life-years (undiscounted) gained over time due to alco-
hol tax increases in the Dutch scenario for mean values of the input parameters as displayed in table 2.
20 40 60 80 100
Years
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
Dutchscenario
Health gains
  1, 000
QALYs
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health-care perspective effectively illustrated the advan-
tages compared with interventions whose costs tradition-
ally fall inside the health sector, such as treatment of
alcohol addiction or curative treatments in a hospital set-
ting.
Like all economic evaluation modelling studies, the calcu-
lated costs, effects and cost-effectiveness ratios are condi-
tional on various assumptions. Below we will discuss
some of the assumptions we made to estimate the cost-
effectiveness of increasing alcohol taxes. First, price elas-
ticity is the same for moderate, excessive and dangerous
drinkers. If, for instance, dangerous drinkers react less to
price changes than moderate drinkers [3], health effects of
tax increases may be smaller than we estimated. However,
there are contradictory findings on the exact price elastic-
ity of dangerous drinkers [26,27]. Second, all tax increases
were translated into price increases. We did not take into
account the possibility that producers do not pass on the
tax increase to consumers, resulting in a decrease in their
profit margin. However, if producers only partially pass
on the tax increase to consumers, this will only decrease
the amount of health gains but not influence the cost-
effectiveness. Third, the effects of a tax increase on alcohol
consumption will be sustained in the long run. This
assumption is built on studies that argue that, since alco-
hol consumption is addictive, the long-run price elasticity
is significantly higher than the short-run elasticity. Fourth,
the price elasticity is the same for high as for small price
increases. This is due to the fact that estimates of price
elasticity are estimated on time series with mainly small
price variations over time. Again, this assumption is prob-
ably more important for the estimation of the amount of
health gains rather than the cost-effectiveness ratio. Fifth,
we used price elasticities based on Clements et al [9]. We
preferred to use specific Dutch data, but the available esti-
mates [28] were not specific for the different alcohol prod-
ucts (beer, wine, spirits). In an analysis that did not
include beverages sold in restaurants, bars and hotels,
Leppänen et al [28] found a high value of total elasticity
for alcohol demand in the Netherlands (-1.5). However,
in another analysis, they estimated the price elasticity for
alcohol in the Netherlands at -0.53, which is close to the
weighted average in our analysis that was based on the
Clements elasticities (-0.61). Nevertheless, assuming
higher values of price elasticity would result in more
QALYs gained and increased health-care costs due to
increases in life expectancy. For instance, modelling an
elasticity of -1.5 for all alcohol types, 13,000 QALYs will
be gained at costs of €65,000,000. So, while both QALYs
and costs will increase, the ICER would remain almost
unchanged.
In the comparative quantification of health risks study,
health effects of average alcohol consumption and pat-
terns of drinking were estimated separately [29]. In this
study we have limited ourselves to the effects of a tax
increase on average alcohol consumption. This was done
because the CDM models average drinking and the
demand elasticity estimates for alcohol also refer to aver-
age alcohol drinking. Data on the influence of patterns of
drinking are less available than data on overall consump-
Costs differences due to alcohol tax increases in the Dutch scenario (discounted by 4%) Figure 3
Costs differences due to alcohol tax increases in the Dutch scenario (discounted by 4%). Costs differences (dis-
counted by 4%) over time due to alcohol tax increases in the Dutch scenario for mean values of the input parameters as dis-
played in Table 2.BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
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tion, but evidence is accumulating that patterns of drink-
ing affect the link between alcohol and disease and
mortality [29]. For example, the same overall average vol-
ume of alcohol can be consumed in small quantities reg-
ularly with meals (for example, two drinks a day with
meals) or in large quantities on a few occasions (for exam-
ple, two bottles of wine on a single occasion every Friday).
This also implies that we did not model the effects of a tax
increase on alcohol dependence, which is a disorder in
itself. The simulation model we employed did not model
all diseases considered to be related to be alcohol con-
sumption separately. Some were only modelled indirectly
through an elevated mortality risk. This means that we
may have underestimated the impact of alcohol con-
sumption on quality of life and health-care costs and have
overestimated the cost-effectiveness ratio. Furthermore,
the relative risks employed in the CDM are not based on
the most recent meta-analyses. However, the study by
Holman et al [18] was the only study that included rela-
tive risk estimates for the alcohol categories employed in
the CDM for both diseases and mortality, and that pro-
vided estimates of all-cause mortality. Such a category of
all-cause mortality was not used in other studies on the
relative risks of alcohol consumption [23]. In the simula-
tion model we used these estimates of all-cause mortality
to estimate the effects for the causes of death that are not
explicitly in our model. Moreover, a recent meta-analysis
of relative risks on all-cause mortality yielded similar esti-
mates [19], and a recent study from the comparative risk
assessment collaboration group used comparable esti-
mates of relative risks for specific alcohol-related diseases
[30].
In this study we have focused solely on health-care costs,
ignoring broader costs and consequences of alcohol abuse
to society. From a societal perspective, which is often
advocated in economic evaluations [31], other costs and
consequences, such as the damage due to violence and
accidents induced by binge drinking, need to be consid-
ered and may be substantial [32]. Furthermore, since the
price increase is not outweighed by the decrease in con-
sumption, this also implies that tax revenues will increase
if taxes are increased. It should be noted that from a soci-
etal perspective, tax revenues are transfer payments, which
means that they do not increase production but simply
that money flows from one place to the other. Therefore,
Incremental costs and effects in the Dutch scenario Figure 4
Incremental costs and effects in the Dutch scenario. Incremental costs and effects in the Dutch scenario for all values of 
the input parameters.BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
Page 9 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
in cost-effectiveness analyses from a societal perspective
they should be omitted. However, if alcohol taxes are seen
as a health policy instrument, a portion of the additional
tax revenues could be added to health care [7]. Conse-
quently, it can be argued that in this case (part of) the
administrative costs and costs of law enforcement associ-
ated with tax increases should also be taken into account
[13]. All in all, we expect an alcohol tax increase to be even
more cost-effective when a broader societal perspective is
taken.
Conclusion
Focusing on health-care costs and health consequences
for drinkers themselves, an alcohol tax increase is a cost-
effective policy instrument. From a health-care perspec-
tive and taking into account health-care costs related to
increased life expectancy, costs per QALY of the planned
Dutch alcohol tax increase amounted on average to
€5100 per QALY gained and, thus, can be considered cost-
effective. A further alcohol tax increase, as is currently
implemented in Sweden, can result in even more health
gains and is expected to remain cost-effective because of
the strong correlation between increased life expectancy
and increased health-care costs.
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life-year gainedc
Dutch scenario 19 (0/57) 13 (0/39) 65 (-/191) 3500 5100
Swedish scenario 930 (-11/1909) 624 (-7/1291) 3319 (-41/6836) 3600 5300
aDiscounted by 1.5%.
bDiscounted by 4%
cQuality-adjusted life-years and life-years gained discounted by 1.5% and costs discounted by 4%.BMC Medicine 2008, 6:36 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/6/36
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